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EU-Russia 
Four Common Spaces and the Proliferation of the Fuzzy 
Michael Emerson* 
 
The new roadmap 
On the 10
th of May the EU and Russia signed four 
‘roadmap’ documents at summit level in 
Moscow, on the Common Economic Space, the 
Common Space of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, the Common Space of External Security 
and the Common Space on Research, Education 
and Culture. This was the culmination of two 
year’s work since the May 2003 summit that 
decided in principle to create the four spaces as 
a long-term project. It was intended also to give 
new momentum to the relationship, after seeing 
that the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement of 1994 had not become a motor for 
anything very substantial, while the subsequent 
phase (in 1999) of swapping common strategy 
documents also led nowhere in particular.  
Does this new attempt to give structure and 
momentum to the relationship do something 
more substantial? Does it mark a new era in the 
relationship? Does it bear any relationship to 
the massive symbolism on display in Moscow 
the day before, as world leaders joined in the 
celebration of the 60
th anniversary of the end of 
World War II? 
Maybe not so many people will read the 49 
pages of the official texts defining the four 
common spaces.  
 
* Michael Emerson is a Senior Research Fellow, 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 
Brussels. This paper first appeared as a contribution 
to the Hearing of the ALDE Group of the European 
Parliament, on “Securing a common future – EU-
Russia relations”, Strasbourg, 11 May 2005. 
1 Excerpt from the Roadmap for the Common 
Economic Space, Building Blocks for Sustained 
Economic Growth, released 10.05.2005 by the 
European Commission, DG for General Affairs and 
External Relations (retrieved from 
http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/documents_ 
travail/2005/05/10-4spaces/4spaces.pdf). 
Some may set out with good intentions, but discover 
that the first objective reads:
1 
development of harmonized and compatible 
standards, regulations and conformity assessment 
procedures, where appropriate, including through 
enhanced regulatory dialogue and cooperation 
between responsible institutions and a reinforcement 
of the institutional capacities. 
The average citizen will close the book at this point. Yet 
the really determined scholar will march on through the 
texts, searching for the essence with unfailing discipline. 
He or she will discover that it goes on and on like this, 
with almost 400 bulleted action points, where the action is 
mostly phrased in terms of ‘cooperation’ or ‘dialogue’, 
which is becoming the ultimate Euro-Russki diplomatic-
bureaucratic  borsch. Some among the 400 points are 
precisely operational – to say that there were none would 
be to go too far. But the main message is this: the EU and 
Russia are still in a state of profound mutual ambiguity. 
They know that they have to try to make the best of living 
together in the same European home, but do not yet know 
how to do it. The partners seem to parody the old Soviet 
joke from the workplace in the factory: ‘We pretend to 
work and they pretend to pay us’. The Euro-Russki 
variant seems to go like this: ‘We pretend to be 
converging on common European values and they pretend 
to be helping us do so’. 
But let us do our homework seriously. After all, the two 
parties spent two years in allegedly tough negotiations. 
For the EU Council President Jean-Claude Juncker, Prime 
Minister of Luxembourg, said: “Today we have reached 
agreement on the four spaces, including the most difficult 
elements”.
2 President Vladimir Putin said: “I want to 
emphasize that this result was achieved through hard 
work together and an ability to reach mutually beneficial 
compromises. This work was not easy. Our European 
partners displayed their best qualities as negotiators and 
as people who had their sights firmly on getting results.”
3 
                                                      
2 See the press release “Jean-Claude Juncker at the EU-Russia 
summit: ‘Russia and the EU do not intend to divide Europe and 
the adjacent regions into spheres and zones of influence’”, DG 
General Affairs and External Relations, 10.05.2005. 
3 See the “Press Statement and Responses to Questions by 
Vladimir Putin following the Russia-European Union Summit”, 
Centre for 
European 
Policy 
Studies  
CEPS Policy Brief
No. 71/May 2005 2 |MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
The common economic space 
The Common Economic Space is the longest. It proceeds 
through the standard agenda of all EU negotiations with 
its accession candidates and other neighbours and 
association partners: industrial standards, competition and 
public procurement policies, investment climate and 
enterprise policy, cross-border cooperation, financial 
services, accounting standards and statistics, agriculture 
and forestry, customs procedures, transport and 
telecommunications networks, energy, space and 
environment. There is to be cooperation and dialogue 
everywhere. But there is not a single mention of the 
words ‘free trade’, even as a long-term objective. Since 
EU imports from Russia are mainly tariff-free oil and gas, 
the implication is that Russia is not ready to discuss free 
trade. Russian industrial lobbies are fiercely protectionist, 
and EU lobbies are the same in the few industries where 
Russia has competitive strength, such as metallurgy and 
chemicals. While there is a liberal use of the terms 
‘harmonisation’ and ‘convergence’, the texts are evasive 
on who is harmonising or converging on whom. Russia’s 
proud insistence on the principle of being ‘equal partners’ 
seems to have made it impossible to use explicit 
references to EU law, which leaves the substance on the 
long catalogue of technical standards and regulatory 
norms hanging in the air.  
Freedom, security and justice 
The Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(FSJ) is also the subject of a long and detailed text. The 
common commitments made towards combating 
international crime, drug trafficking and terrorism have a 
more vivid content. This second space is sprinkled with 
quite numerous points for concrete cooperation between 
Russian security agencies and the growing number of EU 
agencies, such as Europol, Eurojust and the anti-terrorism 
special representative. Here the EU and Russia face 
common threats, and so the search for useful cooperation 
can proceed.    
Special mention has to be made of the preamble, which 
contains a brief symbolic reference to adherence to 
common values of democracy, rule of law and human 
rights. A main point about the four common spaces is 
they are lacking precisely what for the EU should be the 
most fundamental space of all – that for democracy. The 
contrast has to be made with the new Action Plans of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy, all of which give pride 
of place to democracy, the rule of law and human rights, 
with comprehensive and detailed action points in this 
sector. The de-democratising Russia of President Putin 
manifestly could not embark on negotiations on a 
common space of democracy. Yet the EU could not 
ignore the subject. The result is token inclusion of a few 
lines in this common space for FSJ.  
                                                                                          
President of Russia Official web portal, 10.05.2005 (retrievable 
from http://kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2005/05/10/2030_type 
82914type82915_88025.shtml). 
Russia was a demandeur under this second space for 
facilitating the movement of peoples, aiming in the long 
run at visa-free travel with the EU. This led to substantial 
negotiations, with the EU demanding for its part a 
strengthening of Russia’s border management, starting 
with its proper demarcation, which is not yet done with 
Latvia. The EU’s second demand is for a re-admission 
agreement, according to which Russia should agree to 
accept back into its territory any person who had illegally 
entered the EU from Russia. This presents a serious 
problem for Russia, given its vast and porous Asian 
frontiers. There is no conclusion yet to these negotiations, 
so the texts have had to retain remarks about continuing 
parallel negotiations on visa facilitation and re-admission. 
There were frank remarks by President Putin at the press 
conference in this context: “The Russian Federation has to 
do a lot. We cannot make excessive requirements to our 
partners until our neighbours and we have resolved border 
problems and until we have handled all readmission 
issues raised by our European partners.”
4  
External security 
The Common Space of External Security was potentially 
the most interesting innovation. The agendas for 
cooperation over terrorism and non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction are quite rich.  
In the field of crisis management, however, it is 
disappointing. There is a reference in the roadmap to 
“dialogue and cooperation in the settlement of regional 
conflicts, inter alia in regions adjacent to EU and Russian 
borders”.
5 This language had been the subject of long and 
sensitive negotiations, the EU initially advancing the 
language of ‘common neighbourhood’, which was too 
much for Russia’s proprietary attitudes towards its ‘near 
abroad’. The EU presidency’s press release talks 
explicitly about the frozen conflicts of Transnistria, 
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh, but the 
official text could not go beyond the ‘adjacent regions’ in 
general. It had been inferred in the press from remarks by 
President Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in the 
weeks before the summit that Russia might be moving in 
some real sense towards cooperation over these frozen 
conflicts. But here easy diplomatic language has to be 
sorted out from harsh realities. The latter are that Russia 
is militarily and politically protecting the secessionist 
regimes of Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
whose leaderships are notoriously undemocratic and 
deeply engaged in illegal business activity. If Russia 
wanted to help resolve these conflicts it could, for 
example, welcome the apparent intentions now of Ukraine 
and Moldova to control illegal traffic across the 
Transnistrian frontier, and in the case of South Ossetia 
cooperate with Georgia over control of the single tunnel 
route from Russian Northern Ossetia into Georgian 
Southern Ossetia. But it does not do so, because its 
                                                      
4 Ibid. 
5 Op. cit. EU-RUSSIA – FOUR COMMON SPACES AND THE PROLIFERATION OF THE FUZZY| 3 
foreign policy remains dictated by old-fashioned 
conceptions of national interest (military presence 
dominates values such as the rule of law). In these 
circumstances the third common space about external 
security with respect to crisis management is empty. 
Russia’s ruling elite appear not to have digested how 
costly this is for its political reputation – and therefore 
influence – in the whole of the wider European space.   
Research, education and culture 
The fourth Common Space of Research, Education and 
Culture is seemingly the least political and most practical. 
It is all about two broad activities, first the inclusion of 
Russian students and researchers in a variety of EU 
programmes, and second alignment of Russia on common 
European norms for educational standards. It can be 
argued, given the political inhibitions over deeper 
integration between the EU and Russia for the time being, 
that this ‘academic space’ is even the most important. At 
least its time horizon is sound. It will doubtless take a 
generation or two for Russia and the EU to genuinely 
converge in terms of mindsets and political values 
perceived across society as a whole. The negotiators 
could have gone further in deciding a significant 
redeployment of EU Tacis resources in favour of 
educational initiatives such as scholarship, versus 
expensive technical assistance projects that have been 
extremely difficult to execute effectively. The document 
lists a plethora of educational initiatives, yet it is not 
transparent what resources they are to profit from or 
whether they amount to something important.  
Two unanswered questions 
The four spaces and the 400 action points leave 
nonetheless two unanswered questions. When and how 
may Russia really converge on modern European values? 
When and how is the EU going to make up its mind on 
the definition of its outer geographic and political 
contours? 
Europe now surely enters a new episode in the post-
Communist transition politics of virtually all of the 
European states of the former Soviet Union, except 
Russia. They all now have, or are being drawn towards, a 
second attempt at true democratisation and withdrawal 
from Russia’s sphere of political domination. Russia tried 
in the last few years to make re-consolidation of the CIS 
space its foreign policy priority. Its clumsy methods were 
a big failure, even to the point of being counterproductive. 
Political Russia is not normatively attractive to its 
neighbours, and will not become so again until it is seen 
to embrace true democracy. The EU did less than nothing 
to organise this as a conspiracy. Even today the EU’s 
policies towards Ukraine and Georgia have traces of 
deference to Russia, at least on the part of some old 
member states. Will Ukraine’s Orange Revolution 
actually succeed? This is not yet quite clear at the level of 
government policy, but it does seem that civil society has 
made the big break. If Ukraine succeeds, one can wonder 
whether this might help lead Russian society and its 
political elite to conclude that the time has come for it too 
to resume the long march towards the modern world of 
advanced democracies.  
For the EU body politik there is also some sorting out to 
do, as illustrated in a recent article in Le Monde by a 
French philosopher:
6  
Le traité constitutionnel…tourne le dos à une histoire 
qui ne fut, parait-il, qu’une expérience douloureuse, et 
reste indéfiniment extensible, quant à sa géographie et 
ses compétences. Cette prolifération du flou est une 
manière d’être de l’Union européenne, à quoi la 
Convention…n’a pas voulu mettre fin…ce que 
permettrait un vote non. 
The European Union has manifestly not made up its mind 
between two visions: the ideal of an entirely democratic 
Europe, with a continuing process of enlargement for the 
accession of all European democracies, including notably 
in due course Turkey and Ukraine if they meet the 
standards, versus the consolidation of a more politically 
compact Europe – a Europe-puissance, and one maybe 
with a closer cultural Christian identity too.  
The four common spaces are indeed a manifestation of 
the “proliferation of the fuzzy”.  They represent the 
outermost extension of the EU’s internal logic. The 
European Neighbourhood Policy, which Russia does not 
want to be covered by, is itself a weak and fuzzy 
derivative of the EU’s enlargement process. This 
neighbourhood policy is embracing the same 
comprehensive agenda of the EU’s internal policy 
competences and political values, but without the mega-
incentive of accession. The four common spaces are now 
a weaker and fuzzier still derivative of the neighbourhood 
policy, giving only token attention to democracy and 
excluding explicit reference to EU norms as the reference 
for Russian-EU convergence. As a result the roadmaps do 
not really inform us about where the EU and Russia are 
heading.     
Conclusions 
An overall assessment might be as follows: 
•  The two sides were keen to have a positive 
outcome, in particular to stop the slide towards 
the increasing mutual irritation of the recent 
period. So there was a set of agreed papers that 
                                                      
6 Paul Thibaud, “Qui sont et où sont les bons européens?”, 
Le Monde, 11 May 2005:  
The constitutional treaty…turns its back on a history, 
which it seems, was just a painful experience, and remains 
indefinitively extensible for its geography and its 
competences. This proliferation of the fuzzy is a manner 
of being for the European Union, and something which 
the Constitution…did not want to end…and which 
authorizes a ‘no’ vote [in the forthcoming French 
referendum over ratification of the Constitution].  
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could be given a spin of strategic content. One 
can agree there could have been worse outcomes.  
•  It is manifestly not true, however, that the two 
parties reached agreement on the most difficult 
elements, and some press conference declarations 
(particularly those of the ephemeral EU 
presidency) are debased political discourse.  
•  President Putin seems to have acknowledged that 
the EU had succeeded in setting the terms of 
engagement, with the four-spaces negotiations 
effectively testing how far Russia could be 
brought into convergence with EU norms and 
values. But the answer to the ‘how far?’ question 
is an ambiguous ‘thus far, not far’. 
•  Yet the EU is itself ambiguous. It has worked out 
for itself a well-identified corpus of law, norms 
and values. But it does not have a well-defined 
model for exporting these beyond suggesting 
weak and fuzzy derivatives of the enlargement 
process, while it cannot afford to overextend the 
real enlargement process for vital, even 
existential reasons.     
•  These two ambiguities look as though they will 
continue to dominate the EU-Russia relationship 
for the foreseeable future. The four spaces are 
another exercise in a reasonably courteous 
management of ambiguity.   
 
 
About CEPS 
Founded in 1983, the Centre for European Policy Studies is an independent policy research institute 
dedicated to producing sound policy research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges facing 
Europe today. Funding is obtained from membership fees, contributions from official institutions 
(European Commission, other international and multilateral institutions, and national bodies), 
foundation grants, project research, conferences fees and publication sales. 
Goals 
•  To achieve high standards of academic excellence and maintain unqualified independence. 
•  To provide a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process. 
•  To build collaborative networks of researchers, policy-makers and business across the whole of 
Europe. 
•  To disseminate our findings and views through a regular flow of publications and public events. 
Assets and Achievements 
•  Complete independence to set its own priorities and freedom from any outside influence. 
•  Authoritative research by an international staff with a demonstrated capability to analyse policy 
questions and anticipate trends well before they become topics of general public discussion. 
•  Formation of seven different research networks, comprising some 140 research institutes from 
throughout Europe and beyond, to complement and consolidate our research expertise and to 
greatly extend our reach in a wide range of areas from agricultural and security policy to climate 
change, JHA and economic analysis. 
•  An extensive network of external collaborators, including some 35 senior associates with extensive 
working experience in EU affairs. 